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The province of Ontario has become Canada's largest wind energy market.  This was a 
result of distinct policies established by the provincial government to encourage 
renewable energy developments as part of its power supply system.  Using distributive 
justice as a lens, this study aims to clarify how wind energy policy design influences 
community outcomes for municipalities that host wind turbine projects.  Community 
benefit agreements between municipalities and wind project developers are a prominent 
tool for distributing financial benefits to local populations and these were used 
throughout Ontario as part of the wind energy development process.  A comparative 
analysis is undertaken to examine the characteristics of three distinct Ontario policy 
periods against the measured outcomes of community benefit agreements collected 
from host municipalities of large wind projects.  An increase in use and value of 
community benefit agreements is observed across all three policy periods.  This 
corresponds with expectations of policy characteristics relating to public and municipal 
opposition and familiarity of the development process by municipalities.  The observed 
influence was less consistent for characteristics associated with power contract rates, 
local versus central planning authority, and procurement incentives.  The results also 
quantified the financial contributions of industrial wind turbine projects to local 
communities on an individual municipal basis.  The findings of this study will help 
understand how policies impact community benefits, can inform future wind energy 
programs, and creates a reference to increases the transparency of financial 
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In 2003, the Ontario government began promoting a policy of renewable energy 
development as a viable way forward for provincial electricity generation.  By creating 
policy environments to support new 'green' energy projects, the province has seen 
certain sectors of renewable energy grow from nearly non-existent levels to wide 
spread implementation.  As a major component of the province's green energy plan, 
the construction of large-scale industrial wind projects has garnered particular 
attention due to their prevalence and visibility, as well as a number of controversial 
implications affecting mainly rural municipalities and residents. 
Municipal governments were central to the narrative of wind energy growth in Ontario.  
They exercised varying levels of approval authority within the development process 
and their direct engagement with developers influenced  the successful 
implementation of wind energy projects in their communities.  This occurred through 
mechanisms such as municipal-provincial relations, negotiations with developers, 
and project appeals within the environmental approval process.   
Municipalities also received pressures from various actors to support or oppose wind 
project developments.  Anti-wind organizations lobbied local politicians and councils 
to stand against wind projects, a position that was juxtaposed by landowners who 
stood to receive income from property rentals and developers who promoted 




Community benefit agreements are a commonly used device when developing large 
scale infrastructure projects with negative externalities, such as industrial wind 
energy developments.  They typically involve financial contributions to the host 
community above and beyond any landowner payments or mandated taxes.  These 
contributions can be viewed as 'goodwill' gestures or compensatory mitigation, 
depending on one's perspective toward the subject development.  While benefit 
agreements are often used as a mechanism by developers to garner local support for 
potentially controversial projects, they also present an opportunity for municipalities 
to capitalize on available funding and share benefits more widely throughout the 
community.   However, there is no universally adopted method to apply or administer 
community benefit agreements in the context of wind energy projects and distributive 
inequities have been observed in some studied regions (Munday, Bristow, & Cowell, 
2011). 
The large scale implementation and rapidly changing presence of the renewable 
energy industry in Ontario from 2003 to 2018 created a variety of political and public 
policy challenges that have been examined academically (Fast & Mabee, 2015; 
Stokes L. C., 2016; Christidis, Lewis, & Bigelow, 2017; Walker & Baxter, 2017a; 
Bues, 2018).  Current provincial leadership in Ontario has placed a pause on green 
energy program initiatives.  This creates a chance to retrospectively analyze the 
previous government's policy impacts.  
This paper examines how Ontario's distinct policy periods and approaches to 
renewable energy implementation influenced the benefits received by municipalities 




were prominently used in the Ontario wind energy development process, however, a 
research lacuna exists that limits our understanding of their application in the Ontario 
context.  The potential for community benefit agreements to act as a new revenue 
stream is an important consideration for would-be host municipalities faced with 
future wind developments.  It is similarly critical for policy makers to know how 
provincial investments in green energy were dispersed at the local level via private 
wind development projects. 
Through the following sections, I will review the origins and timeline of programs 
created through Ontario's renewable energy policy environment and outline in more 
detail how the acquisition and construction of wind energy projects was handled in 
the province.  I will then introduce the concept of distributive justice and identify 
commonly applied mechanisms used in large-scale wind developments processes to 
address relationships with the local community.  The focus will then narrow to 
defining community benefit agreements, why they are important in Ontario, and how 
their use has been promoted and observed in other jurisdictions with wind energy 
projects.   
Drawing on the academic literature, an overall hypothesis is created with five sub-
hypotheses statements based on characteristics expected to influence community 
benefit agreements within Ontario.  After outlining the methods undertaken to identify 
and collect community benefit agreements with Ontario municipalities, the data is 
organized and related back to each of the sub-hypotheses based on observations.  
Finally, I will discuss the relevance of these findings with respect to Ontario 





Progression of Ontario Green Energy Policy  
Between 2003 and 2018, the province of Ontario established several green energy 
programs where independent project owners were provided the opportunity to enter 
into renewable energy supply contracts with the provincial electrical regulator, the 
Ontario Power Authority (OPA) - later the Independent Electricity System Operator 
(IESO).  Program elements, such as procurement method, price structure, and 
incentives were adjusted through the policy environments, resulting in varying levels 
of attraction from large and small developers to construct renewable energy projects.  
Although various electrical generating sources, such as solar, hydro, biomass, bio-
fuel, landfill gas, and bio-gas, were included in the renewable energy programs, wind 
energy played a prominent role in the provincial strategy throughout the policy 
timeline.  The following section provides a chronology outlining the major policy 
instruments used and the interaction between stakeholders, industry, and local and 
provincial governments.  Following that, a closer look will be taken specifically at 
wind energy and the resultant impacts of its increased presence in Ontario. 
In 2003, the province of Ontario, under a majority Liberal government, officially 
adopted policy direction to encourage electricity generation from renewable sources 
by setting targets to increase green energy production by 5% of the total provincial 
generating capacity, approximately 1350 megawatts (MW)1, by 2007.  Wind, hydro, 
and renewable biomass were identified as key areas for expansion within the 
electrical generating system.  At the same time, the province began to take steps 
                                            




toward closing its five coal-fired electrical generation facilities within the same 
timeline.  These two measures were promoted as moving Ontario toward cleaner, 
'greener' energy sources (Ontario, 2019). 
Several other global jurisdictions, particularly in Western Europe, had already 
initiated similar green energy endeavours and could be looked to for examples of 
policy models.  These ranged from state owned projects to neo-liberal systems that 
attracted private developers through two common methods: feed-in tariffs that 
provided preset fixed dollar rates to perspective developers for electrical generation; 
and open-market bidding that saw developers establish competitive electrical rates 
as part of project proposals.  To achieve its goal, Ontario policy makers created the 
Renewable Energy Supply (RES) program that used an open-market auction of new 
network generating capacity.  This system invited private developers to bid on a set 
quota of electrical production made available exclusively for renewable energy 
projects.  Electricity supply contracts were offered under three rounds of auction that 
took place between 2004 and 2007, titled RES I (2004), RES II (2005), and RES III 
(2007). 
Toward the end of the RES program, from 2006 to 2008, an alternate system of 
procurement was created for smaller green energy projects.  This program only 
targeted developments up to 10 MW in size and was called the Renewable Energy 
Standard Offer Program (RESOP).  The RESOP differed from the RES in that it 
utilized a feed-in tariff model, as opposed to a competitive bidding process, that set 
fixed electrical rates for private project applicants.  Electrical generation rates for 




hour) compared to those awarded under the RES (8.0 to 8.6 cents per kilowatt-hour) 
(Holburn, Lui, & Morand, 2010).  These rates were attractive and made the RESOP 
susceptible to large-scale developers breaking up projects into multiple smaller 
components in order to meet the 10 MW cap and participate in the program (Holburn, 
Lui, & Morand, 2010; Loudermilk, 2017). 
By the time the RES and RESOP ended in 2008, Ontario had seen a significant 
uptake in renewable energy activity, although it ultimately fell short of its stated goals, 
meeting only 60% of the 1350 MW target (Loudermilk, 2017).  Public reception of 
these projects was mixed, especially in those communities that played host to the 
new developments.  While some municipalities welcomed the potential for economic 
gains to local land owners and promised employment, others "vigorously resisted 
local zoning approvals" (Loudermilk, 2017, p. 2) and many of the projects were never 
constructed. 
In response to local resistance and to further expand Ontario's green energy market, 
the province created and passed the Green Energy and Green Economy Act in 2009, 
also commonly referred to as the Green Energy Act (GEA).  Then Premier and 
leader of the provincial Liberal Party, Dalton McGuinty, justified this move by stating: 
"We're going to find a way through this new legislation to make it perfectly 
clear that NIMBYism will no longer prevail when it comes to putting up wind 
turbines, solar panels and bio-fuel plants…We need those jobs. We need 
clean electricity, and we need to assume our full responsibility in the face of 




This legislation established a top-down policy environment to streamline renewable 
energy project approvals, which would be controlled by the province.  This meant 
that planning approvals were removed from the local municipal authority and were 
now granted through a special provincial Renewable Energy Approval (REA) process. 
Coupled with the introduction of the GEA, a second, more ambitious phase of 
renewable energy acquisition was developed and promoted as the Feed-in-Tariff 
(FIT) program.  Just under 5,500 MW of contracted capacity was offered in five 
rounds (labeled version FIT 1 through FIT 5) between 2009 and 2016 (IESO, 2020).  
At its onset, the program awarded power contract agreements to developers on a 
"first-come, first-serve basis" to achieve set capacity implementation targets (Fast, et 
al., 2016).  After award of the power agreement, successful projects were then 
required to satisfy the provincial REA requirements, which included local community 
engagement, before proceeding to construction.  
The FIT program guaranteed higher set electrical rates to developers than previously 
seen under the RES and RESOP; a base rate was set for wind energy contracts at 
13.5 cents per kilowatt-hour under FIT 1 and the later FIT 2 to FIT 5 programs had 
commitments of between 11.5 and 12.8 cents per kilowatt-hour (Loudermilk, 2017).  
These higher set contract rates, along with a new streamline approval process, 
attracted significant investment from new green energy developers under the FIT 
program. 
The FIT program also introduced a unique consideration from its predecessors in 




base electrical contract rate for projects that had Indigenous or community partners.  
The bonuses were weighted based on percent community control of the project, 
designed to "encourage local partnerships and to help Aboriginal and community 
partners maximize their equity share (Ontario Power Authority, 2010, p. 9)."  Wind 
developments were able to earn up to a maximum of 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour for 
Indigenous control and 1.0 cent per kilowatt-hour for community control in projects. 
During the same time period that FIT was active, the government also directly 
negotiated the Green Energy Investment Agreement (GEIA) with developers for an 
additional 2,500 MW of wind and solar production.  Although these projects 
circumvented the FIT application process, and were awarded through ministerial 
directive, they received the FIT price structure (Duguid, 2010). 
In 2014 the province again adjusted the acquisition process for renewable energy 
projects.  The FIT program was retained for projects smaller than 500 kW in size and 
a new Large Renewable Procurement (LRP) program was established for 
developments that exceeded this threshold.  The LRP program incorporated notable 
changes from the previous FIT processes.  
The first change was that the new cost structure designed for the LRP program 
moved away from the standard offer, feed-in tariff systems previously employed and 
returned to a competitive market-based price system.  Prospective developers 
responded to a request-for-proposal (RFP), in which they were required to submit 




and scored based on several factors, including the value of the power purchase 
agreement. 
Second, as part of the LRP RFP, "Community Engagement" rating points could be 
earned for projects that demonstrated the following: municipal council or First Nation 
support resolutions; municipal host agreements that clarify expectations, 
responsibilities and costs related to the project; support from landowners abutting 
wind turbine properties; and Indigenous participation or partnership in the project 
(Ministry of Energy, 2015).  Although these points did not provide financial benefits, 
as noted in the FIT system, they did factor into the selection criteria to increase the 
likelihood of being awarded a contract. 
Lastly, project developers were required to initiate consultation through meetings with 
both the host municipality(ies) and the public prior to submitting a project proposal.  
This was a marked difference from the post-award consultation requirements 
identified in the FIT process. 
The LRP program was rolled out in two phases across 2015 and 2016.  LRP I 
resulted in successful proponents for 16 renewable energy projects, totaling 455 MW 
(5 wind contracts, 300 MW total).  LRP II was initiated, but cancelled when the 
Minister of Energy announced its suspension on September 27, 2016 (IESO, 2020). 
Following the 2018 provincial election, the newly elected government, formed by the 
Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, acted on election promises to end the GEA 




and planning authority for renewable energy projects was returned to municipalities, 
effectively putting a halt to green energy development in Ontario (Ontario, 2018). 
Wind Energy Implementation and Reception in Ontario  
Although the province's green energy programs supported a number of renewable 
technology sources, much of the public focus resided in the area of wind power.  
Wind project developments were a highly visible representation of the provincial 
policy goals and the source of wide-spread land use planning discussions, 
particularly throughout the predominantly rural communities where they were located.  
Ontario's wind energy projects consist of construction of anywhere between one to 
over one hundred industrial wind turbine towers, in some cases, standing over 150 
metres high.  Some municipalities were host to multiple projects with hundreds of 
turbine sites that were often accompanied by kilometres of transmission towers to 
connect the projects to the grid.  The following section outlines wind project 
implementation within Ontario's renewable policies in greater detail, how they were 
received by municipalities and special interest groups, and the province's response. 
In 12 years, Ontario went from being a province with nearly zero wind presence to 
becoming Canada's largest wind energy market, hosting 96 projects totaling more 
than 2,500 constructed wind turbines.  This constituted over 5000 MW of potential 
electrical generation - 12% of Ontario's installed capacity (CanWEA, 2019; IESO, 
2019).  The majority of the wind energy generation capacity was contracted through 
the three RES auctions, FIT 1 (including the GEIA, which was awarded through 




timeline of the primary periods and processes for wind implementation in Ontario are 
identified in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of wind energy implementation in Ontario. 
Initially, the provincial direction to increase renewable energy sources received 
widespread public support.  Polling carried out in 2010 indicated that 89 percent of 
Ontarians "supported wind energy in their region" and 86 percent felt that their 
"municipal government should encourage and facilitate wind energy development 
(Ipsos Reid, 2010; Baxter, Morzarina, & Hirsch, 2013)."  Despite these indicators, 
grass roots opposition began to emerge in impacted municipalities or areas 
'threatened' by wind development.  "By the 2011 election, every district with a wind 
turbine had at least one anti-wind group (Stokes L. C., 2016, p. 962)." 
The introduction of the GEA in 2009 was framed by the Province as a mechanism to 
remove the burden of approvals and pressure from anti-wind groups at the local 
planning level and centralize the decision making process.  In many communities, 
this ended up galvanizing local government with wind opponents and, by 2015, 90 of 
Ontario's 444 municipalities had made formal declarations of council identifying 




At the same time the FIT program created strong financial incentives, attracting 
large-scale international developers that came with their own financial backing to 
construct projects.  There was little uptake on the program's local investment 
incentives (Fast, et al., 2016, p. 2) and, due to power contract award conditions that 
set strict penalties on projects that were not operational on time, developers were 
under pressure to complete the REA requirements and proceed to construction.  This 
created public concerns about developments being "rubber-stamped" or rushed 
through approvals by the province and, while many projects were appealed to the 
provincial Environmental Review Tribunal by opposition groups and some 
municipalities, very few were rejected (McRobert, Tennent-Riddell, & Walker, 2016). 
As a result of growing opposition, and to specifically address municipal pushback of 
the FIT process under the GEA, the province once again adjusted its renewable 
energy policy instruments, this time with the introduction of the LRP.  Provincial 
communication to municipalities indicated: 
"The LRP program has been designed to provide municipalities with a 
stronger voice and additional opportunities to participate in the development of 
renewable energy projects. As a competitive procurement program, it is also 
designed to encourage cost-efficient renewable energy projects to provide 
value for ratepayers (Ministry of Energy, 2015, p. 19)." 
The LRP evaluation process clearly encouraged initiating community engagement 
early in the development process.  This move, however, was not enough to reverse 




C., 2016).  The program incentives did not have the desired outcome, as only 40 
percent of the selected wind energy projects under LRP were able to obtain local 
municipal or surrounding landowner support (IESO, 2016; McRobert, Tennent-
Riddell, & Walker, 2016). 
Ontario also saw other widespread technical issues throughout the green energy 
implementation process, such as limited access or capacity of the existing electrical 
grid to receive input from new wind projects (Quick, Law, Christidis, & Paller, 2016; 
Loudermilk, 2017).  In some cases, projects were postponed or had their power 
contracts delayed until upgrades could be completed by the provincial transmission 
provider.  In later instances, projects considered through the LRP program were 
prioritized, in part, based on the geographic capacity of the electricity grid (Ministry of 
Energy, 2015). 
Ultimately, after the 2016 cancellation of the FIT II process by the Liberals, before it 
could be completed, and with many wind energy developments still being 
constructed in communities as the province was entering a provincial election, the 
Progressive Conservatives and New Democratic Party both made strong platform 
stances against the GEA as a strategy for renewable energy implementation (Shreve, 
2018).  Before his party was defeated in the 2018 election, the Ontario Energy 
Minister Glenn Thibeault was quoted regarding the green energy procurements, 
stating: “How we implemented those policies led to a number of sub-optimal 
outcomes (Hill, 2017).”  Shortly after taking power, the new Progressive Conservative 
government repealed the GEA and cancelled several uncompleted wind projects 





Distributive Justice and Community Benefits  
With the details of Ontario's wind energy policy periods established, we can draw on 
other academia and theory to determine how community benefit agreements fit into 
the narrative of wind power project developments.  Based on John Rawls' social 
justice theory, distributive and procedural justice are commonly applied lenses 
through which to examine how wind energy projects interact and impact the 
communities where they are installed turbines (Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 2011; 
Walker, Wiersma, & Bailey, 2014; Liljenfeldt & Pettersson, 2017; Walker & Baxter, 
2017a; Walker & Baxter, 2017b).  While procedural justice considers the 
engagement efforts and tools that developers use to inform and include local 
communities in the siting and decision making processes, distributive justice 
concentrates on the dissemination of negative and positive impacts from wind turbine 
projects.  This study only briefly touch on concepts of citizen engagement, trust, and 
legitimacy and focuses on the 'who gets what' distributive facet of wind energy 
developments to consider how community benefit agreements between wind energy 
projects and municipalities were influenced by Ontario policy decisions. 
We see distributive justice contextualized in wind energy project discourse through 
the positive and negative aspects attributed to industrial wind turbine construction.  
Opponents to these projects frequently draw upon arguments of noise, aesthetic 
impacts, and potential health effects on nearby residents or land users.  In contrast, 
those in favour of wind projects rely on virtues, such as job creation, landowner 




generate support.  Financial compensation is a tool frequently relied upon in the 
development process to account for land-use rights, offset negative externalities, or 
incentivize local support.  The perception of good benefit distribution within the 
community can be tied to successful project reception and, in contrast, dissatisfaction 
with distribution may develop if seen to be unfair or inadequate, leading to decreased 
support (Walker & Baxter, 2017a). 
Some mandated financial distribution mechanisms are nearly ubiquitous in western 
wind developments, such as increased land use taxes and lease arrangements with 
landowners for wind turbines placed on their property.  In Ontario, individual property 
owners are thought to receive compensation of roughly $8,000 per turbine per year 
(Walker, Baxter, & Ouellette, 2014; CanWEA, 2008), however, this information is not 
publically accessible or widely shared in the community due to the confidentiality of 
the agreements. 
Although less consistent in their use, other distributive systems can be found in wind 
energy relationships with host communities, commonly referred to as 'community 
benefits'.  A plurality exists in both the terminology and application of formal and 
informal arrangements between host communities and wind energy developments 
(Kerr, Johnson, & Weir, 2017; Macdonald, Glass, & Creamer, 2017).  Job creation 
and infrastructure improvements may result naturally out of the development itself 
and are sometimes discussed in this category.  However, cooperative ownership, 
community investment in the project, community benefit agreements, and vibrancy 
funds are prominently noted forms of community benefits (Munday, Bristow, & Cowell, 




voluntary and/or negotiated interactions between the host community and wind 
project developer, or be encouraged through specific policy instruments in the 
development process.  A further outline of community benefits is provided in Table 1: 
Table 1: Types of Community Benefits (adapted from DECC, 2014, p. 8 and Munday, et al, 2011, p. 3) 
Community Benefit Type Description 
Community Benefit 
Agreements 
 Direct financial contributions from a wind developer 
to the community. 
 Usually provided via annual monetary payment, but 
may be lump sum. 
 Also referred to as Community Benefit Fund or 
Vibrancy Fund. 
In-Kind Benefits   Other provisions with value to the community by the 
wind developer. 
 May include in-kind works, funding of special 
projects, local energy discounts, local 
sponsorships, hosting local events, or 
natural/environmental enhancements. 
Community Partnerships  Where the project is partially or fully owned by the 
community through investment in the wind project. 
 Communities typically receive a return on 
investment, but also take on project risk. 
 Also referred to as Community Investment, Shared 
Ownership, or Cooperative Ownership. 
Socio-Economic Benefits  Job creation, direct employment, skills training, and 
educational or environmental awareness 
opportunities. 
Material Benefits  Derived from actions taken directly related to the 
development. 
 e.g. infrastructure upgrades required to complete 
the project. 
 
Community benefits are traditionally associated with garnering local backing based 
on a rational economic model where their provision equates to enhanced support 
(Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 2011; Walker & Baxter, 2017a; Walker, Russel, & Kruz, 
2017).  This is relevant, as most jurisdictions have an approval process for 




broad based policy direction in a centralized system or from a grass-roots resident 
base with access to local decision makers.  However, the rational relationship 
between community benefits and support is not unconditional.  Aitken (2010) found 
benefit arrangements were considered to be of value amongst community members 
and groups, but also saw evidence that the same arrangements were seen as 
attempts to "bribe" the community and that this feeling persisted after construction.  
This has been noted in the Ontario context where financial benefits to host 
communities has led to increased support for wind energy projects but is tempered 
by indications that compensation in the absence of procedural justice may have the 
opposite effect, resulting in perceptions of bribery or "blood money" (Cowell, Bristow, 
& Munday, 2011; Walker & Baxter, 2017a). 
Therefore, framing and communication are critical to the success or usefulness of 
benefit arrangements in wind developments. Kerr, Johnson & Weir (2017) point out 
the UK government's emphasis on terminology such as "community benefit 
payments," not "compensation;" the latter carrying the implication that a 'wrong' has 
occurred.  Although there is evidence to show the negative context of community 
"bribes" may be mitigated through institutionalized programs (i.e. regulated by the 
state) (Walker, Russel, & Kruz, 2017, p. 74), Cowell, Bristow & Munday (2011) found 
in the UK that there was still a strong desire to allow unencumbered negotiation 
between the affected community and wind project developers.  Mindful of the 
outward facing duality of community benefit arrangements, Walker, Baxter & 
Ouellette (2014) suggests that "cautious optimism" should be used when considering 




In addition, the fairness of benefit distribution is important.  The 'right people getting 
the right amount' from wind developments has been associated with public 
perceptions of wind developments in host communities.  Walker & Baxter (2017a) 
found more support for participatory models, such as community ownership, when 
compared to simple financial input.  While local and cooperative ownership schemes 
for wind projects are common in some European jurisdictions, such as Germany, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands (Toke, Breukers, & Wolsink, 2008), a polarization 
toward financial contributions to communities was observed in UK wind project 
implementation (Strachan, Cowell, Ellis, Sherry-Brennan, & Toke, 2015).  Ontario's 
case mirrored the UK environment with few local governments deciding to partner 
with wind energy developments (Fast & Mabee, 2015; Walker & Baxter, 2017a; 
Walker & Baxter, 2017b).  Indeed, Jami & Walsh (2017) recount the following 
statement by the Minister of Energy who tabled the GEA as part of their study: 
"When we were crafting the policy we did not properly anticipate the ease with 
which developers would attract capital.  We rather expected the model, which 
we saw and liked so much in Denmark where local projects typically had 
hundreds of local investors, was going to be the model.  We expected that 
developers were going to have to be more community integrated in order to 
raise local financial capital.  I criticize my own efforts and look at the Green 
Energy Act and say, oh this worked and this didn't, that's one of the things that 
I think in our construct didn't emerge the way we had expected." 
So, while it is recognized that, in addition to private leases with landowners, financial 




benefit distribution (Walker & Baxter, 2017a, p. 764), it remains the most prominent 
community wide benefit tool considered throughout the implementation of Ontario's 
green energy programs. 
Community Benefit Agreements  
Recognizing that there are various applications that can be used to consider 
distributive justice, in the Ontario case community benefit agreements offer both a 
wide spread and quantifiable variable to demonstrate local benefit sharing.  A more 
complete definition and review of community benefit agreement application is 
presented below to structure subsequent hypothesis formulation and analysis. 
Where wind project developers agree to make annual or lump sum financial 
contributions to a host community, this is typically formalized through some form of 
community benefit agreement that defines the term, amount, any conditions for the 
money's use, and the governing body for the funds. In Ontario, where agreements 
exist, they are commonly executed between the project owner and the municipal 
government.  While discussion of the definition of 'community' and appropriate 
governance of funds is noted in the UK (Bristow, Cowell, & Munday, 2012), Ontario 
based literature presented no examples of benefit agreements being held outside the 
local government, who is responsible for allocating the funds. 
In Ontario, as in the UK case, offering and negotiating benefit agreements is 
voluntary on behalf of the developer.  Retaining a perception of 'goodwill' is important 
for developers, as it allows them to direct community narratives away from 




Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) presents an alternative motive to connotations 
of payoffs for approvals and wrongdoing (Kerr, Johnson, & Weir, 2017).   
Large corporate developers frequently hold the balance of power when negotiating 
with rural community bodies who often have limited resources and exposure to these 
types of projects (Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 2011).  Jami & Walsh (2017) 
suggested that municipalities could "use their leverage in extraordinary ways to 
figure out opportunities to the benefit of the local community (p.22)."  However, this 
"leverage" typically resides in venues of planning approvals and centralized, 
technocratic shifts in policy direction can act to remove power from municipalities; 
such was the Ontario case with the elimination of local planning authority for wind 
projects under the GEA. 
Other policy instruments developed in the UK act to create a more equitable 'playing 
field' between communities and developers, although stop short of mandated 
direction on community benefits.  The Community Benefits from Onshore Wind 
Developments: Best Practice Guide for England overtly encourages municipalities to 
purse agreements with developers as "a rare opportunity for the local community to 
access resources, including long-term, reliable and flexible funding to directly 
enhance their local economy, society and environment (DECC, 2014, p. 9)."  In 
addition, the English Register of Community Benefits and Engagement is a voluntary 
initiative established to document and publically communicate benefit arrangements 
in England and Scotland (Kerr, Johnson, & Weir, 2017).  These initiatives provide a 
level of transparency and accessibility to both the negotiating parties and community 




THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Provincial leadership in Ontario developed deliberate policy environments to 
establish wind power production as part of its renewable energy strategy.  This goal 
was achieved through the installation of over 2,500 wind turbines across mostly rural 
communities with varying levels of acceptance or resistance.  Although they were not 
mandated as a policy instrument by the province, community benefit agreements 
played a significant role in Ontario wind energy implementation (Walker & Baxter, 
2017a).  Commonly seen as a mechanism to demonstrate goodwill and garner 
support for wind turbine projects, which can be advantageous for developers who 
want move smoothly through the REA process, benefit agreements also present a 
reciprocal opportunity for municipalities to access long-term fiscal resources from 
wind projects.  The municipal government, then, becomes an agent of benefit 
distribution to local residents, so it is important that we understand what factors lead 
to benefit agreement outcomes. 
Community benefit agreements have been a specific area of focus for both academia 
and government policy makers in England, Scotland, and Wales as an integral part 
of wind project implementation.  Although project case study comparisons comprised 
of a limited number of wind projects have been considered in the Ontario context, an 
analysis of benefit agreements has not been carried out on a province-wide basis.  
Walker & Baxter (2014) suggest that similar transparent practices, such as 
community benefit registries in the UK, would better inform provincial and municipal 
decision making relating to wind energy developments.  This is supported by 




provincial policy development and, where community benefit agreements are 
considered to play a role in local acceptance (as they are viewed in the UK), they 
have the potential to play a more obvert role in achieving wind energy goals.  
Viewing wind energy development through a distributive justice lens, this paper 
considers the following research question: 
How did Ontario wind energy policy design influence community benefit 
agreement outcomes for host municipalities? 
In addition to addressing this question, a secondary benefit of this research is that it 
documents the benefits formalized between wind developers and municipalities in 
Ontario.  As far as the literature review has indicated, no other consolidated source 
of record for Ontario municipal benefit agreements exists and only one other 
research paper was found to publish any actual community benefit agreement values 
for the Ontario context (Fast & Mabee, 2015, p. 32). 
Given that there are distinct characteristics observed within the stages of Ontario's 
policy environment for wind energy projects and that some stages provide more 
incentive for developers to enter into negotiated benefit agreements with local 
municipalities than others, the following general hypothesis guides this analysis: 
H:  Ontario policy structures for wind energy projects that encourage and 
incentivize local municipal support result in more frequent and higher 




A summary of the primary Ontario programs for wind energy development, as 
outlined in the previous sections, is provided in Table 2.  In it, we can identify several 
variables that are expected to influence community benefit agreement use.  The fixed 
power rates provided under the FIT period are greater than the resultant competitive 
pricing under the RES and LRP periods.  We note that the RES period was the only 
era to operate with local planning authority intact, before provincial REA's were 
introduced under the GEA.  Lastly, while no specific incentives were built into the 
RES acquisition process, the FIT period offered additional financial incentives for 
wind projects that found community investors and projects that could demonstrate 
community support under the LRP system were advantaged in the scoring and 
award process for power contracts. 
Beyond the noted factors in Table 2, there are two additional variables that are 
considered relevant to community benefit agreement outcomes.  First, a visible 
increase in public and municipal opposition toward wind energy projects was noted 
throughout the timeline of their implementation.  Second, wind projects in Ontario 
were virtually nonexistent prior to initiation of the RES program.  This created an 
environment of increasing understanding of wind energy projects over time as 
municipalities developed expectations when dealing with developers. 
The above identified factors can be applied to the overall research question and 
hypothesis.  To explore this, five direct sub-hypotheses based on these variables are 
stated and justified in greater detail below.  A summary of the sub-hypotheses and 
their expected influence on municipal benefit outcomes is provided in Table 3 at the 











RES 2004 - 2007 8 - 8.6  Pre GEA - Local planning authority. 
 Competitive pricing. 
 Unconstrained power contract offer. 
FIT 2009 - 2011 13.5* - 16**  GEA applicable - Provincial approval 
process. 
 Fixed pricing. 
 Financial price incentives for equity 
ownership by Indigenous and 
community proponents.  
LRP 2016 8.6  GEA applicable - Provincial approval 
process. 
 Competitive pricing. 
 Proposal scoring incentive for projects 
with landowner/leaseholder support, 
community support, project community 
agreement, and Indigenous 
participation. 
(Holburn, Lui, & Morand, 2010; Loudermilk, 2017; Ontario Power Authority, 2010; IESO, 2019) 
Notes: RES includes RES I, II & III average awarded contract price. 
FIT includes FIT 1 and GEIA contracts (*Base price; **Price with incentives). 
LRP average awarded contract price. 
Financial Input into Ontario's Green Energy Sector 
The first element to consider is money.  The financial compensation for power 
production is likely to have a direct impact on available funds within a 
development project to share with host municipalities.  Indeed, Toke, et al. (2008) 
notes implementation issues in the UK neo-liberal 'market based' systems that 
saw developers underbid competitors to the extent of making projects 
economically unviable.  Where tight profit margins or instability exist, there would 
be little room for community contributions, unless mandated.  Based on a rational 
economic calculation, when the price of energy that can be earned is higher, and 




voluntarily engage in benefit agreements with the host municipality to garner 
project support.2 
Ontario saw distinct financial policy instruments applied to its three primary wind 
energy programs.  Under the RES period, power contract pricing for wind projects 
was determined through competitive auction.  The FIT system used fixed 
electrical contract offer rates for successful projects and, beyond that, made 
additional financial commitments to projects that partnered with municipalities or 
First Nation communities.  Policy shift under the LRP period saw a return to the 
competitive project pricing model, rather than the previously pre-set offers, but 
administered contract awards through a RFP process.  It should be noted that, 
although the LRP program's power contract award criteria gave preference to 
projects that had community support, no additional financial incentives were 
offered. 
H1:  More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur 
under Ontario policy structures with higher power contract prices for wind 
energy projects. 
Structure of the Application and Approval Process 
A second element to consider is the process of being awarded contracts for 
power generation.  Implementation of the GEA was the most prominent change to 
                                            
2 It should be noted that power purchase agreement rates are just one component to wind project 
economic viability.  Other influential factors are also present, such as variable costs for electrical grid 
hook-up, available potential wind energy, and environmental accommodations.  While it is recognized 
that these additional factors play a financial role in wind energy development, they are beyond the 




Ontario's process for wind energy projects.  By removing planning authority from 
the jurisdiction of local governments, the province consolidated power between 
itself and wind developers.  In the RES system (pre-GEA), developers needed to 
gain acceptance of local decision makers or risk extended appeal processes and 
uncertain outcomes through an adjudicated tribunal via the Ontario Municipal 
Board.  The FIT and LRP systems (post-GEA) removed local decision making, 
replacing it with streamlined provincial approvals.  Based on the conventional 
framing of community benefits as a "device for fostering social acceptability" 
(Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 2011, p. 540) there is an expectation of higher and 
more frequent use of benefit agreements in the pre-GEA era, where reliance on 
local cooperation is more crucial, than in post-GEA regimes.  This is additionally 
supported by Ontario research that indicates allowing agreement negotiations to 
take place in a local planning environment will result in better financial outcomes 
for municipalities (Fast & Mabee, 2015). 
H2:  More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur 
under Ontario policy structures where projects require local planning 
approvals. 
However, post-GEA processes for wind developments were not devoid of local 
consideration.  The FIT process provided financial incentive for local municipal or 
Indigenous ownership and project approvals under the LRP included weighted 
proposal scores for projects with documented local support.  Although the former 
applied only to direct community investment, in the latter process we, again, 




for a better chance of provincial approval and potentially to offset higher electrical 
rates in the proposals. 
H3:  More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur 
under Ontario policy structures that incentivize local community and 
government support. 
These two hypotheses compete with each other in the Ontario case where, as the 
province removed the local approval authority related to H2 through legislation, it 
later tried to reinstate local involvement through the acquisition process related to 
H3. 
Actor Influence  
As noted previously, community benefits are often seen as a way of gathering 
support for projects.  Therefore, other actors outside the formal arrangements of 
wind energy projects could potentially influence the willingness of developer and 
municipalities to enter into benefit agreements.  Opposition to wind turbine 
projects increased throughout the provincial policy timeline, both by the 
organization of local public resistance groups and by municipalities, through 
formal council statements against wind developments (Stokes L. C., 2016; Bues, 
2018).  Fast & Mabee (2015) additionally noted a general increase in anti-wind 
media coverage through the FIT period.  The province was observed to react to 
mounting visible opposition from the public and municipalities, first by the 
Premiere's statements justifying creation of the GEA to combat 'NIMBY' 




municipal cooperation.  A reasonable action by developers is to look to 
community benefit agreements as an opportunity to enhance corporate image 
and garner local project support when presented with opposition from that sector.  
The expectation for Ontario's case, then, is to see an increase in frequency at 
each stage of green energy implementation as opposition likewise increased. 
H4:  More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur 
under Ontario policy structures with higher levels of public and municipal 
opposition. 
Finally, we should consider how the normative behaviour of actors associated 
with community benefit agreements changes over time.  In Wales, Bristow et al. 
(2012) found an increasing expectation of benefit arrangements by both 
developers and communities and they were observed to be more frequently used 
and the typical value increased over time.  One explanation for this trend was that 
application of benefit agreements was established as "shadow contracts" 
between the actors prior to any formal arrangements being discussed (Kerr, 
Johnson, & Weir, 2017).  As the practice became more common, a preconceived 
expectation developed amongst the parties that some form of benefits will be 
provided to the host municipality.  In some policy regions, this expectation has 
become more formal, such as the Scottish Government's 'Good Practice 
Principles' recommendation of £5,000 per MW per year (Macdonald, Glass, & 
Creamer, 2017, p. 178).  Although no formal policy has been implemented in 




application of benefit agreements would increase their likelihood of expectation 
and application over time. 
H5:  More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur 
over time as actors become more familiar with the application of benefit 
agreements. 








Competitive OPA Contract Rate (Auction) Financial  
Local Planning Approvals Required  Structural  
No Contract Incentives for Local Support Structural  
Low Opposition Actor  
Low Local Familiarity Actor  
FIT 
Higher Fixed OPA Contract Rate Financial  
Local Planning Approvals Removed Structural  





Increasing Opposition Actor  
Increasing Local Familiarity Actor  
LRP 
Competitive OPA Contract Rate (Proposal) Financial  
Local Planning Approvals Removed Structural  





High Opposition Actor  
High Local Familiarity Actor  







This project uses a comparative analytical approach to consider characteristics of 
community benefit agreements for Ontario wind energy projects developed across a 
longitudinal timeline.  The timeline is segmented into three distinct policy periods of 
green energy implementation: RES, FIT, and LRP.  The overall timeline is bounded 
by the introduction of specific green energy programming in 2004 and the end of the 
provincial direction for green energy projects in 2018. 
An analytical assessment of the collected quantitative data was used for comparison, 
as opposed to statistical methods.  This decision for this approach was taken 
because there are numerous socioeconomic and environmental factors that would 
need to be considered in order to conduct a robust statistical analysis between 
communities (Fast & Mabee, 2015; Liljenfeldt & Pettersson, 2017; Quick, Law, 
Christidis, & Paller, 2016; Stokes L. C., 2016; Walker, Baxter, & Ouellette, 2014).  
The analytical style used in this report reflects similar methods of review from other 
studies on community benefits (Bristow, Cowell, & Munday, 2012; Cowell, Bristow, & 
Munday, 2011; Munday, Bristow, & Cowell, 2011; Toke, Breukers, & Wolsink, 2008). 
Data 
The data for this research were obtained through a number of secondary sources 
and an original dataset created from documentation received from selected lower- 
and single-tier municipalities.  The data selection criteria and collection process for 




Wind Energy Project Data 
Christidis (2013) identifies the difficulties in collecting and verifying data relating to 
wind turbine projects in Ontario and this issue is additionally noted by at least one 
other researcher (Stokes L. C., 2016).  No unified repository of Ontario wind energy 
or renewable energy projects currently exists.  Project details and siting information, 
including individual wind tower locations, are largely unconsolidated.  This data was 
sourced from multiple venues, some of which included limited detail or were of 
uncertain reliability and required further corroboration through cross-referencing with 
more formal sources. 
Renewable wind energy project information was initially collected and assembled 
from the following resources: 
o MOEE Renewable Energy Project Listings  
o IESO websites for Feed-in Tariff Program, Energy Procurement 
Programs and Contracts, and Wind Power in Ontario mapping 
o Ivey Business School Policy Brief (Loudermilk, 2017) 
o Individual wind project and municipal websites 
The initial dataset identified 75 individual Ontario wind projects ranging from 2.35 to 
300 MW.  This cohort was refined by limiting the research pool to only those projects 
equal to or greater than 40 MW in nameplate capacity3 located in the Ontario Ministry 
                                            





of Environment, Conservation and Parks Southwest, West Central, and Eastern 
Regions.  The basis for this decision were as follows: 
1) A 40 MW wind energy project typically consists of 10 to 20 industrial wind 
turbine sites.  Projects of this size and greater present a significant community 
impact to warrant and influence benefit agreements. 
2) Projects in Northern Ontario were excluded due to unique challenges relating 
to costs associated with that region, such as access to labour markets and 
distance from manufacturers. 
3) Although the 40 MW threshold resulted in eliminating projects from the dataset, 
the study still considered the majority of identified wind energy projects 
constituting approximately 80 percent of Ontario's wind power generating 
capacity (CanWEA, 2019; IESO, 2019). 
These changes led to a revised database of 41 wind energy projects that included 
the project name, number of turbines, name plate capacity of the project in MW, the 
project proponent and/or the current project owner's name, the REA status and REA 
approval date (where available), the OPA or IESO contract date, and a municipality 
identifying the geographic location of the project. 
Municipal Host Identification 
This study chose to concentrate on municipal benefits of single- and lower-tier 
governments in Ontario.  These levels of government were responsible for land use 
planning approvals of renewable energy projects before that role was centralized at 




allows for a comparison of approval environments between pre- and post-GEA 
implementation. 
However, wind project and provincial records in the above dataset were found to be 
inconsistent when identifying the municipal locations of wind turbine developments.  
Lower-tier host municipalities were frequently not referenced in the source 
documents and single- and upper-tier municipalities were found to be the most 
commonly named geographic project location.  In addition, it is not uncommon for 
wind projects to span across municipal boundaries and no provincial records were 
found that quantified the number of turbines or name plate capacity when multiple 
municipalities were identified as host. 
Because of these ambiguities, additional research was undertaken to identify and 
confirm host municipalities and their respective wind energy project details for each 
of the projects in the previously noted dataset.  Again, due to the lack of a centralized 
source, it was necessary to outline the geographic impact of the wind energy projects 
using an on-line source, Ontario Wind Turbines mapping (Ontario Wind Turbines, 
2015), a no longer functional website that was linked from a wind turbine opposition 
group (Ontario Wind Resistance).  This data was then verified using publically 
available project mapping and geospatially compared using Google Earth Pro and 
municipal boundary shapefiles, obtained through the Ontario Data Catalogue (MMAH, 
2015).  The individual number of turbines, capacity, and, in some cases, omitted 




Municipal Benefit Agreement Data 
To obtain benefit data, agreements between municipalities and identified wind project 
developers were requested from the Clerk (or directed office) in individual 
municipalities.  Where necessary, a formal Freedom of Information request was 
placed through process of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act, 1990 to obtain the requested documentation.  In addition, agreement 
documentation was supplemented with information gathered from municipal web 
pages, council agendas and archives of meeting minutes. 
An assessment was undertaken of each agreement or associated municipal account 
of negotiations to classify and valuate benefits received from wind energy 
proponents.  Collected data concentrated on financial flows to the municipality, such 
as community vibrancy funds, that were not tied to compensation, damages, or other 
identified direct impacts.  These secondary receipts were also noted, but kept 
separate from the unencumbered benefits.  Where multiple factors were contained 
within a single agreement, the 'non-benefit' classification and values were parsed into 
separate categories, but not included in the analysis. 
Both the total annual value of the provided benefit as well as the dollar amounts per 
MW of installed power capacity were calculated for the dataset.  The latter of these 
normalizes the data to better compare different project sizes and involvement across 
municipalities and has been used as a basis for policy targets (Macdonald, Glass, & 




large numbers of wind energy projects (Bristow, Cowell, & Munday, 2012; Cowell, 
Bristow, & Munday, 2011; Munday, Bristow, & Cowell, 2011).  
The term of the agreements were noted, where available and generally correspond 
with the associated IESO power purchase agreements with wind projects.  Nearly all 
were confirmed to be for a period of 20 years.  At least one municipal contribution 
was received as a lump sum payment.  This dollar figure was distributed equally 
across the life of the agreement to achieve a per annum value and normalized as 
above for comparison purposes. 
Many of the municipal agreements specifically outlined the number and capacity of 
wind turbines planned for construction within their boundary.  This information was 
also used to further verify the impacts of the wind energy projects noted through 
previous data acquisition methods.  Where there was a discrepancy between the two 
datasets, the values in the agreements were used, unless significant documentation 
existed to suggest that these values were altered in the final project construction. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
There are several limitations to note in regard to how this study was structured.  The 
first is a risk of the data being incomplete.  The previously indicated unconsolidated 
nature of the source data, discrepancies in information between datasets (e.g. 
project names, owners, host municipalities, etc.), and limited post construction 
documentation (e.g. turbine numbers and locations) creates reliability concerns.  In 
addition, it is possible that all municipal agreements were not obtained due to 




against multiple sources and where deviations were found, judgment was used to 
determine which was most reliable. 
Another limitation may result from restricting the research pool to only those projects 
equal to or greater than 40 MW in size, excluding smaller industrial wind turbine 
projects.  There may be aspects associated with smaller developments that are not 
captured in the data presented in this study.  Other studies have observed 
heterogeneous public reactions to wind developments based on the size and 
configuration of projects, resultant in greater community acceptance of smaller, 
dispersed projects (Walker, Baxter, & Ouellette, 2014; Bues, 2018).  This dichotomy 
may impact the use of benefit agreements if opposition within communities is 
similarly influenced, but was not considered further in this study. 
Although all projects within the RES policy period exceeded the 40 MW threshold, 
smaller projects awarded in the FIT and LRP policy periods were precluded from the 
study.   In addition, all wind projects initiated under the RESOP fell below the size 
limit set above.4  This resulted in the RESOP not being considered as one of the 
policy periods examined as part of this study. 
The last limitation relates to differences in wind potential across the province.  Wind 
potential is a determinant of profitability wind energy projects.  More profitable 
developments may be more willing to share revenues through benefit agreements 
with municipalities to garner local support.  Quantifying wind potential based on 
                                            
4 It is estimated that 35 projects representing approximately 350 MW in total were constructed as part 




geographic location of developments and examining the relationship to project 
profitability was beyond the scope of this study and not included in the analysis. 
In addition to the above limitations, several assumptions were required when 
assembling the final dataset.  Four wind projects that received power purchase 
agreements from IESO and had either completed or were in the process of 
completing REA's were subsequently cancelled following the 2018 Provincial election.  
The details of these projects and the application of their data are as follows: 
1. Nation Rise Wind Farm 
Policy Period: LRP 
Cancelled: December 2019 
Municipality: Township of North Stormont. 
Data Use: Community benefit agreement was executed prior to 
cancellation; data retained in study. 
2. Strong Breeze Wind Project 
Policy Period: LRP 
Cancelled: July 2018 
Municipality: Municipality of Dutton Dunwich 
Data Use: Draft community benefit agreement was negotiated but 
remained unexecuted following the project cancellation; 




3. Otter Creek Wind Farm 
Policy Period: LRP 
Cancelled: July 2018 
Municipality: Municipality of Chatham-Kent. 
Data Use: Agreements not obtained; not included in study. 
4. White Pine Wind Farm 
Policy Period: FIT 
Cancelled: July 2018 
Municipality: Prince Edward County 
Data Use: Agreements not obtained; not included in study. 
Although it is possible that if the draft agreement obtained from the Municipality of 
Dutton Dunwich had proceeded, it may have undergone revisions before it was 
executed, the state of documentation and values included in the agreement suggest 





RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
This study identified 27 lower- and single-tier municipalities that are host to 41 wind 
projects equal to or greater than 40 MW in size, regardless of total capacity located 
in the individual municipality.  24 of those municipalities were either able to provide 
some form of municipal agreement(s) or confirm that no agreement was entered into 
with the identified wind energy developer.  Two municipalities did not respond and 
two municipalities were only able to confirm agreements for a portion of projects in 
their respective communities.  The Municipality of Chatham-Kent was also isolated 
from the study data due to the preliminary status of the data sources and the unique 
arrangements made with wind developments, as further discussed below.  A map of 
the municipalities identified as part of this study is presented as Figure 2.  
After eliminating municipalities with unconfirmed data and accounting for projects 
that were sited across municipal boundaries, this study analyzed a total of 39 
relationships between municipalities and wind farm developments.  This included 
instances where a benefit agreement exists between a municipality and developer 
and when no agreement was present.  Where agreements were present, they were 
reviewed to quantify the value and nature of the agreements.  The considered 
dataset is presented in Appendix A and a summary of the findings is provided in 





Figure 2: Community benefit agreement status of Ontario municipalities with wind energy projects equal 
to or larger than 40 MW identified as part of this study.  Google Earth Pro V 7.3.2.5776 (March 5, 2019). 
Ontario, Canada. 43°52'57.81"N, 79°47'20.13"W, elev 275m, eye alt 982.32 km. SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, 
GEBCO [January 29, 2020]. 
Table 4: Community Benefit Agreement Outcomes in Ontario (adapted from Cowell, et al. (2011); Munday, 
et al. (2011); Bristow, et al. (2012)) 









Community benefit agreements 
(provision of money by developer) 
   
Number of benefit agreements 4 20 3 
Average agreement payment 
($/MW/year) 
$1,673 $3,243 $3,389 
Agreement payment range 
($/MW/year) 
$99 - $3,261 $192 - $7,000 $3,000 - $4,167 
Projects hosted without municipal 
benefit agreements in place 





In total 27 community benefit agreements were enacted between Ontario 
municipalities and wind developments; 12 instances were confirmed where hosted 
projects had no benefit agreement in place with municipalities.  In general, a rise in 
the use and value of benefit agreements is observed across the timeline of this study.  
Figure 3 shows that, on a percent basis, benefit agreements were used more 
frequently in the latter policy periods, with 50 percent implementation during the RES 
period, increasing to 100 percent use for projects initiated as part of the LRP period. 
 
Figure 3: Use of municipal benefit agreements by policy period. RES: n=8; FIT: n=28; LRP: n=3. 
The average value of benefits agreements also rose across the three periods (see 
Figure 4).  There was a notable rise from the RES to FIT periods and a smaller 
increase from the FIT to LRP periods.  The variation in observed agreement values 







































for each policy period: RES (n=4) mean = $1,673 with s.d. = $1,527; FIT (n=20) 
mean = $3,243 with s.d. = $1,350; LRP (n=3) mean = $3,389 with s.d. = $674.  
These calculations show that benefit values became more similar as the province 
moved from one policy period to the next.  However, the distribution of benefit values 
shown in the Figure 4 box plot identifies several additional considerations.  Four 
outliers (two high and two low) were noted in the FIT period, impacting the standard 
deviation for the dataset.  When those four outliers are accounted for, the range of 
benefit values in the FIT period appear more concentrated than the LRP period.   
Two of the periods were also observed to contain repeated data values for different 
developer-municipal relationships.  12 of the 20 cases in the FIT dataset were valued 
at $3,500 and 2 of the 3 cases in the LRP dataset were valued at $3,000.  This would 
be unexpected if all agreements in each period were negotiated independently, but 
not if there was a tendency by municipalities and developers to use a common price 
per MW on which to base community benefit agreement values.  It should also be 
noted that the limited data points for benefit values in the RES (four) and LRP (three) 





Figure 4: Municipal benefit agreement values under each policy period.  'x' denotes mean value for 
each policy period, as indicated by 'Average agreement payment' in Table 4.  Median 
values: RES = $1,674; FIT = $3,500; RES = $3,000.  Box limits represent lower quartile (Q1) 
and upper quartile (Q3) of each period.  Whisker lines represent period maximum (max) 
and minimum (min) ranges, excluding outliers. Notes: for FIT period, the median = Q3 = 
max = $3,500; for LRP period, median = Q1 = min = $3,000 and Q3 = max = $4,167. 
We can now relate this data to the original research question.  The observed metrics 
of implementation rate and average value of municipal host benefit agreements can 
be used to determine where policy characteristics associated with each of the 
Ontario wind energy policy periods impacted benefit agreements for municipalities.  
Expected outcomes of each of the policy periods based on the previously stated sub-




















H1 Power Contract Rates Financial   - 
H2 Local Planning Approvals Structural  -  
H3 Incentives for Local Support Structural -   
H4 Opposition Intensity Actor    
H5 Municipal Familiarity Actor    
 
Financial 
H1 predicted a positive relationship between electrical generation rates offered to 
wind developments and municipal benefit agreement metrics.  Figure 5 shows the 
municipal benefit agreement values plotted against the date of the provincial 
power purchase agreement for the wind energy development, grouped into the 
three policy periods.  Recalling Table 2, Ontario power contract prices for wind 
energy projects were highest under the FIT (13.5 - 16 ¢/kWh) process and lowest 
(and relatively equal) within the RES (8 - 8.6 ¢/kWh) and LRP (8.6 ¢/kWh) periods.  
An increase of benefit values and use were observed during the transition from 
the RES to FIT programs corresponding with the increase in power purchase 
rates, as would be expected by H1.  However, even though electrical rates 
decreased from the FIT to LRP periods, municipal benefit agreement metrics 






Figure 5: Municipal benefit agreement values for each policy period plotted by date that the hosted wind 
energy project received its provincial power purchase agreement (n=39).  Zero dollar value was used 
where no municipal benefit agreements was identified. 
Based on the open market, competitive bidding structure that the province used 
for the RES and LRP programs, these two periods were expected to be the most 
disadvantaged eras to provide financial capacity for community benefit 
agreements.  Examples of underbidding competitors were noted in other regional 
acquisition processes (Toke, Breukers, & Wolsink, 2008, p. 1138).  However, 
even with similar electrical price incentives, the RES and LRP period differed in 
application of community benefit agreements, with the RES demonstrating the 
lowest metrics and LRP period the highest, indicating that financial incentives for 
wind projects may not be a strong influence on when and how much developers 
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H2 indicated that the requirement for local planning approvals would produce 
higher municipal benefit metrics than approval systems that are centralized at 
upper levels of government.  This was based on the expectation that benefit 
agreements would be used to garner support from local approval authorities, who 
would view the relationship as a positive community financial resource.  The RES 
was the only program that existed prior to the GEA, when local approvals for wind 
energy projects were still intact.  If the tendency to have benefit agreements is 
tied to local municipal requirements, they should be seen more prevalently in this 
initial stage, as opposed to the latter FIT and LRP periods under the GEA's 
centralized approval process.  However, this was not observed in practice, as the 
RES program saw the lowest use and value for benefit agreements.  In addition, 
while the FIT and LRP were equal, based on their lack of local planning 
application requirements, an increase in the benefit agreement metrics was seen 
from the FIT to LRP periods. 
The LRP application process contained specific incentives that encouraged 
developers to obtain local support prior to submitting proposals to the province.  
Projects that satisfied this requirement received bonus marks toward successful 
award of an electrical generating contract with the IESO.  This was not seen in 
the RES and FIT policies.5  H3 predicted that policies that include provisions for 
community support would result in better benefit opportunities for municipalities.  
                                            
5 Although the FIT program incentivized project partnerships through increased power contract rates, 




The highest benefit agreement indicators were found in the LRP stage, when 
compared to the two earlier programs, meeting expectations of the H3 sub-
hypothesis.  However, this does not explain the increase in metrics from the RES 
to FIT phases, where we would expect no change in benefit use and value since 
the program incentives remained static across these two periods. 
Actor 
H4 relied on the traditionally-held position that developers will use community 
benefits to garner local support in the face of strong opposition.  Ontario saw 
increasing opposition to wind energy projects throughout the policy periods, both 
publically (Stokes L. C., 2016) and municipally through the occurrence of an 
increasing number of 'unwilling host' declarations.  The posited relationship to the 
actors' position was observed through an increase in the benefit agreement 
indicators through all three policy periods. 
The anticipated outcome under H5 was that municipalities would come to expect 
the use of benefit agreements by developers as these relationships became more 
common and that this expectation would grow stronger over time.  This was 
observed in Wales (Munday, Bristow, & Cowell, 2011) and supports the notion of 
an established "shadow contract" between municipalities and developers, as 
identified by Kerr, et al. (2017).  Although variable, benefit agreement metrics 
showed a general increased over time from the RES to FIT and from the FIT to 




The relationships of H4 and H5 are tied to the environments and events at the time 
that municipal-developer negotiations took place.  A plot of benefit value 
according to the date of community benefit agreement, as executed by the 
municipality, can be found in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Municipal benefit agreement values plotted by benefit agreement date (n=27).  Projects-
municipal relationships without benefit agreements (i.e. zero values) were excluded as no date can be 
attributed. 
Other Observations 
Beyond the overall measure of benefit agreements with respect to policy 
environments, we can take away several additional observations from the collected 
data. 
Annual municipal benefit agreement contribution values are provided in Figure 7 
broken out by municipality and by policy era.  Individual municipalities are shown to 













































identified in this study.  Collectively, this accounts for over $7 million per year in 
municipal revenues across Ontario.  Not surprisingly, projects implemented under the 
FIT policy period contribute the largest cumulative dollar value to municipalities, as it 
had nearly three times the number of agreements as the other two periods combined. 
 
Figure 7: Annual benefit agreement contributions to individual municipalities.  Note that projects 
associated with the Municipality of Dutton Dunwich and the Township of North Stormont were 
subsequently cancelled. 
All but three municipalities were found to have some form of additional agreement 
with wind developers, either beyond or instead of community benefit agreements.  
These generally provided compensation for municipal services, infrastructure use, 
and consulting or legal review fees on behalf of the municipality.  Several forms of 
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these agreements were noted: Road Use Agreements for installation of buried utility 
lines and impacts related to public road allowances; Transmission and Collection 
Line Agreements compensating for the placement of overhead power lines along 
public lands; and Restoration Agreements paying for specific or projected repairs to 
municipal infrastructure as a result of the wind project.  One local government in the 
study, the Municipality of Kincardine, also negotiated a lump sum payment of just 
over $1 million toward the local airport.6  The value of these agreements were not 
included in the Community Benefit Agreement data as the contexts all dealt with 
some type of remuneration for damages or required services directly relating to the 
project.7 
It was not uncommon for wind development projects to span across municipal 
boundaries.  Nine (9) projects in total were found to impact more than one 
municipality.  Of these, five (5) developers provided the same benefit contribution to 
all host communities and two (2) developers were found to provide inconsistent dollar 
values to different municipalities hosting the same project. 
Eleven (11) municipalities were host to multiple wind energy projects.  Of those, only 
two (2) had consistent agreement values with all developers located in their 
municipality; seven (7) had varying benefit amounts from different projects or were 
inconsistent in their application of agreement use (i.e. had a community benefit 
agreement for one project, but not another).  
                                            
6 The Municipality of Chatham-Kent also received contributions toward to its municipally owned 
airport. 
7 The donations from wind developers to municipal airports were found to be, at least in part, a form of 
compensation to address direct safety impacts on the airport operations from installed or proposed 




The Case of Chatham-Kent 
Although isolated from this study, the Municipality of Chatham-Kent demonstrated 
several interesting qualities relating to wind energy projects that are noted further 
below.   
Chatham-Kent was found to have hosted wind energy projects from all three 
provincial policy periods, with and without community benefit agreements in place.  In 
addition, although there are other smaller wind energy projects with community 
partner agreements in Ontario (Walker & Baxter, 2017a), Chatham-Kent appears to 
be the only municipality in this study cohort to have made arrangements to invest in 
hosted developments.  Lastly, the municipality utilized an additional, observably 
unique form of agreement that negotiated for the wind energy developer to utilize the 
90 per cent municipally owned power utility as a maintenance service provider for 
finished projects. 
The types of the investment arrangements made by Chatham-Kent are speculative 
and difficult to quantify without additional information.  In addition, much of the 
information received from the municipality was derived from preliminary negotiations 
and documentation and could not be verified in its final form. These conditions made 
it difficult or invalid to compare benefits with other Ontario municipalities and benefit 
values from the Municipality of Chatham-Kent are not included in the analyzed 
dataset. 
Recognizing the above limitations, municipal reports to Council regarding Chatham-




context of other municipal relationships.  Chatham-Kent was host to nine projects 
that were equal to or over 40 MW in size from all three policy periods: four RES; four 
FIT; and one LRP; although one of the FIT projects was never constructed.  The 
unconfirmed information available for four (4) of these projects is shown, but qualified, 
in Appendix A. 
One project from the RES period appeared to have no benefit, maintenance or 
partnership agreement associated with its development.  Benefit agreement values 
of $2,000 and $2,130 per MW per year were identified for two projects in the FIT 
period.  A $2,500 per MW per year benefit agreement was considered for the LRP 
project.  These benefit values generally fall within the value ranges observed in other 
municipalities (see Table 4 and Figure 4) for the respective periods, with the 
exception of the LRP project, which had a slightly lower value. 
Negotiations for the above noted FIT and LRP projects in Chatham-Kent included the 
provision of maintenance services to the completed projects from the local utility 
provider.  The maintenance agreement contracts were estimated to range from 
$180,000 to $300,000 per year in value of service provided.  This type of agreement 
was only found within Chatham-Kent.  In addition, a commitment of $2.5 million was 
received from the FIT project developer toward upgrades of the municipally owned 
airport.  A similar arrangement to this was seen in one other Ontario municipality. 
Lastly, Chatham-Kent was observed to consider investment opportunities in one of 
the identified FIT projects and the LRP project.  The municipality was able to option 




preliminary values of these partnerships were estimated be in the order of $2 million 
for the LRP project and $5 million for the FIT project, equated in additional dividend 
payments from the utility to the municipality, and dependent upon actual investment 






The analysis shows that both community benefit agreement use and value increased 
as the province moved from both the RES to FIT and the FIT to LRP policy periods.  
A comparison of the observed outcome to the expected influence of the 
characteristics that formed the basis for our sub-hypotheses statements is presented 
in Table 6 and discussed further below. 














Observed Performance     
Expected Performance     
H1 Power Contract Rates Financial   - 
H2 Local Planning Approvals Structural  -  
H3 Incentives for Local Support Structural -   
H4 Opposition Intensity Actor    
H5 Municipal Familiarity Actor    
 
For Ontario's policy periods, community benefit agreement outcomes were better in 
periods that had more opposition (H4) and where municipalities were more familiar 
with wind turbine projects (H5).  This supports the common assumption that 
developers will use community benefit agreements to build support from local 
residents or decision makers, although does not speak to the efficacy of their use in 
this manner.  It also repeats the findings of the Welsh case where there were 




developers as part of the wind development process as time progressed (Bristow, 
Cowell, & Munday, 2012).  However, Ontario's situation did not see the same 
pressure from upper level government to implement these measures (as in the UK 
recommendations, guidelines, and registries) which may indicate that this occurred 
organically through community-to-community interaction, such as policy diffusion. 
There is indication that the Ontario government's policy decision to offer incentives 
that encourage local support within the wind energy procurement process (H3) led to 
increased benefit agreement use and value for municipalities.  This was observed by 
the increase in community benefit metrics from the earlier periods to the FIT era.  
This expectation-outcome relationship is again in line with the use of benefit 
agreements to gain acceptance locally, however, we cannot tell whether this was 
achieved within the individual communities through this study. 
Little evidence was found to indicate that electrical power contract rates and local 
planning approval requirements influenced community benefit agreement tendencies 
(H1).  However, we did observe an increase in outcomes from the RES to FIT 
periods.  Also the increase in agreement use and values from the FIT to LRP periods 
was notably smaller than the change between the previous periods.  This could 
suggest that a price relationship is present, but was overshadowed by other factors 
in the later periods and not clearly observable.  It could also mean that other financial 
factors not considered in this study played a greater role than anticipated in 
determining how much project money was available to direct toward municipalities 




Lastly, with respect to our identified characteristics, we did not observe the expected 
outcomes from the presence of local planning approvals (H2) in any of the period 
relationships.  This refutes the common assumption of benefit use for local support.  
However, the provincial policy decision to centralize green energy planning approvals 
was a source of pushback from Ontario municipalities, noted through 'unwilling host' 
declarations.  Although not expected as part of the theory development in this study, 
it is possible that the H2 and H4 characteristics created conflicting positions that were 
dominated by local opposition in the observations. 
As future policy is developed, close attention should be paid to the external policy 
environment to ensure that decisions on pricing, incentives, and approval 
centralization do not compete with, or are surpassed by, external influences such as 
local community opposition and expectations of the development process.  Although 
community benefits are not an obvert goal of wind development in Ontario, 
understanding how they are influenced by policy characteristics can help decision 
makers to encourage their use, if desired, or can be lobbied for by municipalities as 
new green energy programs are created. 
In addition to the explored characteristics, the results of this study support the 
position that there is significant potential for municipalities in Ontario to reap financial 
benefits from wind energy projects (DECC, 2014; Jami & Walsh, 2017).  We see this 
through two observations made through the analysis.  First, one single-tier 
municipality (Haldimand County) secured over $1.5 million annually in revenue due 
to the wind energy developments constructed within its boundaries.  Second, the 




million per year in funding to Ontario municipalities.  Although this does not address 
to the actual distributive nature of how municipalities share these values, they are 
significant enough in magnitude to support the concept that local governments 
should not ignore wind projects as a potential revenue source. 
Concerns remain that, although community benefit agreements are used as a tool to 
generate local support for wind projects, perceptions of "blood money" make them 
ineffective in producing actual local gains in this regard (Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 
2011; Walker & Baxter, 2017a).  This deters from the concept of using municipalities 
as the distributive agent for benefits.  However, from a local government perspective, 
the financial supports to municipalities demonstrated above make it difficult to 
dismiss this tool as a valid part of the wind development process.  Walker & Baxter 
(2017b) point out the importance that procedural justice plays in determination of 
acceptance in host communities.  In addition, there is some indication that requiring 
community benefits as part of the policy structure can increase public perceptions of 
legitimacy and mitigate negative framing, such as "bribery" (Walker, Russel, & Kruz, 
2017).  Future wind development processes that incorporate high levels of citizen 
participation and mandate community benefit agreements could present a win-win-
win opportunity for provincial wind energy goals, successful project implementation, 
and fiscal resourcing for municipalities. 
Lastly, the Municipality of Chatham-Kent demonstrated that there can be unique 
opportunities to partner with wind energy developers that were not widely considered 




outcomes that are tailored to the community can be achieved in wind development 






Although wind energy is currently placed 'on hold' in Ontario, research in this area 
remains important for future programs and where implementation is being considered 
in other jurisdictions.  How local communities benefit from these projects is an 
integral part of understanding policy to support wind energy development.  Building 
on the findings of this study, there is opportunity to further consider the role that 
community benefit agreements play in public perceptions and success of local wind 
energy projects.  The information presented here can assist in selecting communities 
for more detailed analysis, focusing on procedural and distributive justice in Ontario 
on a broader scale.  Lastly, more work could be carried out to include the impacts of 
smaller wind developments and make a more detailed examination of the 
approaches taken by the Municiaplity of Chataham-Kent to partner with wind energy 
projects. 
This work contributes to further the understanding of "the 'how' of benefits 
distribution" noted as an important area needing further policy understanding 
(Walker, Baxter, & Ouellette, 2014, p. 741).  For Ontario, we saw increased use and 
value of municipal community benefit agreements across three policy periods.  The 
research found that although electrical pricing, approval processes, and special 
incentives had varying impacts, community benefit agreement outcomes most 
closely aligned with the expectations of local/municipal opposition and the overall 
familiarity of municipalities with the wind developments as characteristics of the 




These results can inform future wind energy implementation policy on how their 
choices influence whether communities get benefit agreements.  This is important for 
municipalities, as this study shows that wind energy projects can provide a valuable, 
long-term, revenue source to support local initiatives. 
The assembled data also forms the most comprehensive list of Ontario community 
benefit agreements and their values to date, which will hopefully increase 
transparency as host municipalities negotiate future wind energy developments 
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Ontario Municipal Benefit Agreements with Large Wind Projects (Arranged by Municipality) 
 












Other Agreements Y N N/A $ / yr $/MW/yr 
Agreement 
Date 
Haldimand County Grand Renewable Energy Park 67 148.6 2-Aug-11 GEIA FIT X 
  
 $   520,100   $          3,500  26-Sep-11 Compensation, Transmission 
Haldimand County Niagara Region Wind Farm 30 90 15-Apr-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   315,000   $          3,500  26-Sep-11 Compensation, Transmission 
Haldimand County Port Dover Nanicoke Wind Farm 45 81 4-Jun-10 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   283,500   $          3,500  26-Sep-11 Compensation, Transmission 
Haldimand County Summerhaven Wind Energy Centre 56 124.4 30-Apr-10 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   435,400   $          3,500  26-Sep-11 Compensation, Transmission 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of Bluewater Bluewater Wind Project 37 59.9 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   149,850   $          2,500  26-Jun-18 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of Bluewater Goshen Wind Energy Centre 13 21.06 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     52,650   $          2,500  26-Jun-18 Compensation 
Municipality of Bluewater Grand Bend Wind Farm 33 81.9 27-Jul-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   286,787   $          3,500  23-Jan-17 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent East Lake St. Clair 55 99.0 5-Aug-11 FIT 1 FIT     X         
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Erieau 55 99.0 5-Aug-11 FIT 1 FIT     X         
Municipality of Chatham-Kent North Kent 1 Wind Project 36 100.0 1-Apr-15 GEIA FIT     X  $   200,000   $          2,000    Partnership, Maintenance Contract 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Otter Creek Wind Farm Project (CANCELLED) 12 50.0 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP     X         
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Raleigh Wind Energy Centre (Dillon) 52 78.0 12-Jan-09 RES II RES     X         
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Romney Wind Energy Centre 16 57.6 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP     X  $   144,000   $          2,500    Partnership, Maintenance Contract 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Port Alma - T1 (KEPA) 44 101.0 21-Nov-05 RES II RES     X         
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Port Alma - T3 (Kruger Chatham) 44 99.4 14-Jan-09 RES III RES     X  $               -     $                 -        
Municipality of Chatham-Kent South Kent Wind Project 124 270.0 2-Aug-11 GEIA FIT     X  $   575,000   $          2,130    Maintenance Contract, Airport 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Talbot Wind Energy Project (Spence) 43 99.0 14-Jan-09 RES III RES     X         
Municipality of Dutton Dunwich Strong Breeze Wind Farm (CANCELLED) 20 57.5 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP X 
  
 $     60,000   $          3,000  1-Jul-15   
Municipality of Kincardine Armow Wind Project 92 180 2-Aug-11 GEIA FIT X 
  
 $   630,000   $          3,500  21-May-14 Compensation, Airport 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Municipality of Lambton Shores Jericho Wind Energy Centre 83 134.5 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   470,750   $          3,500  31-Mar-15 Compensation 
Municipality of North Middlesex Bornish Wind Energy Centre 45 73.5 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   257,250   $          3,500  25-Oct-13 Compensation 
Municipality of South Huron Goshen Wind Energy Centre 50 81 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   283,500   $          3,500  15-Sep-14 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of South Huron Grand Bend Wind Farm 8 19.9 27-Jul-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     69,524   $          3,500  1-Jan-15 Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Prince Edward County White Pines Wind Farm (CANCELLED) 29 59.5 15-Jun-10 FIT 1 FIT     X         




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Town of Kingsville Gosfield 22 51 13-Jan-09 RES III RES     X         
Town of Lakeshore Belle River Wind Project 40 100 22-Sep-14 GEIA FIT X 
  
 $   300,000   $          3,000  24-May-16 Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Town of Lakeshore Pointe Aux Roches 27 49 13-May-10 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     44,280   $              904  13-Jul-10 Compensation 
Town of Lakeshore Romney Wind Energy Centre 1 3.6 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP X 
  
 $     15,000   $          4,167  6-Nov-18 Compensation, Transmission 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation, Collection 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Township of Adelaide-Metcalfe Adelaide Wind Energy Centre 37 60 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     11,542   $              192  8-Sep-15 Restoration 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Township of Amaranth Melancthon II (Amaranth) 18 27 21-Nov-05 RES II RES     X         
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh K2 Wind Farm 140 270 2-Aug-11 GEIA FIT X 
  
 $   702,000   $          2,600  5-Mar-13 Compensation, Collection 
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh Kingsbridge 1 Wind 21 40 24-Dec-06 RES I RES     X         
Township of Frontenac Islands Wolfe Island Wind Farm 86 197.8 21-Nov-05 RES II RES X 
  
 $   645,000   $          3,261  1-Jun-06 Compensation 
Township of Huron-Kinloss Ripley Wind Farm 38 76 21-Nov-05 RES II RES X 
  
 $        7,500   $                99  20-Mar-12 Compensation, Restoration 
Township of Loyalist Amherst Island Wind Farm Project 26 74.3 25-Mar-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   520,100   $          7,000  14-Dec-15 Compensation 
Township of Melancthon Dufferin Wind Farm 49 99.1 23-Jun-10 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   264,201   $          2,666  31-Jul-13 Compensation 
Township of Melancthon Melancthon II (Amaranth) 70 105 21-Nov-05 RES II RES X 
  
 $   280,000   $          2,667  24-Aug-07 Compensation 
Township of Melancthon Melancthon I 45 67.5 24-Nov-04 RES I RES X 
  
 $     45,000   $              667  24-Jul-07 Compensation 
Township of North Stormont Nation Rise Wind Farm (CANCELLED) 29 100 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP X 
  
 $   300,000   $          3,000  10-Apr-18 Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -        




 $               -     $                 -        
Township of Warwick Jericho Wind Energy Centre 12 19.2 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     96,000   $          5,000  26-Jun-14 Compensation 
Township of West Lincoln Niagara Region Wind Farm 44 132 15-Apr-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   462,000   $          3,500  16-Mar-16 Compensation, Transmission 
NOTES: 
             * within municipal boundary 
1 (Loudermilk, 2017) 
               Not used in study 






Ontario Municipal Benefit Agreements with Large Wind Projects (Arranged by Project) 
 












Other Agreements Y N N/A $ / yr $/MW/yr 
Agreement 
Date 
Township of Adelaide-Metcalfe Adelaide Wind Energy Centre 37 60 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     11,542   $              192  8-Sep-15 Restoration 
Township of Loyalist Amherst Island Wind Farm Project 26 74.3 25-Mar-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   520,100   $          7,000  14-Dec-15 Compensation 
Municipality of Kincardine Armow Wind Project 92 180 2-Aug-11 GEIA FIT X 
  
 $   630,000   $          3,500  21-May-14 Compensation, Airport 
Town of Lakeshore Belle River Wind Project 40 100 22-Sep-14 GEIA FIT X 
  
 $   300,000   $          3,000  24-May-16 Compensation 
Municipality of Bluewater Bluewater Wind Project 37 59.9 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   149,850   $          2,500  26-Jun-18 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of North Middlesex Bornish Wind Energy Centre 45 73.5 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   257,250   $          3,500  25-Oct-13 Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation, Collection 




 $               -     $                 -        




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Township of Melancthon Dufferin Wind Farm 49 99.1 23-Jun-10 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   264,201   $          2,666  31-Jul-13 Compensation 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent East Lake St. Clair 55 99.0 5-Aug-11 FIT 1 FIT     X         




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation, Transmission 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Erieau 55 99.0 5-Aug-11 FIT 1 FIT     X         
Town of Kingsville Gosfield 22 51 13-Jan-09 RES III RES     X         
Municipality of Bluewater Goshen Wind Energy Centre 13 21.06 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     52,650   $          2,500  26-Jun-18 Compensation 
Municipality of South Huron Goshen Wind Energy Centre 50 81 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   283,500   $          3,500  15-Sep-14 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of Bluewater Grand Bend Wind Farm 33 81.9 27-Jul-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   286,787   $          3,500  23-Jan-17 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of South Huron Grand Bend Wind Farm 8 19.9 27-Jul-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     69,524   $          3,500  1-Jan-15 Compensation 
Haldimand County Grand Renewable Energy Park 67 148.6 2-Aug-11 GEIA FIT X 
  
 $   520,100   $          3,500  26-Sep-11 Compensation, Transmission 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Municipality of Lambton Shores Jericho Wind Energy Centre 83 134.5 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   470,750   $          3,500  31-Mar-15 Compensation 
Township of Warwick Jericho Wind Energy Centre 12 19.2 30-Sep-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     96,000   $          5,000  26-Jun-14 Compensation 
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh K2 Wind Farm 140 270 2-Aug-11 GEIA FIT X 
  
 $   702,000   $          2,600  5-Mar-13 Compensation, Collection 
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh Kingsbridge 1 Wind 21 40 24-Dec-06 RES I RES     X         
Township of Amaranth Melancthon II (Amaranth) 18 27 21-Nov-05 RES II RES     X         
Township of Melancthon Melancthon II (Amaranth) 70 105 21-Nov-05 RES II RES X 
  
 $   280,000   $          2,667  24-Aug-07 Compensation 
Township of Melancthon Melancthon I 45 67.5 24-Nov-04 RES I RES X 
  
 $     45,000   $              667  24-Jul-07 Compensation 
Township of North Stormont Nation Rise Wind Farm (CANCELLED) 29 100 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP X 
  
 $   300,000   $          3,000  10-Apr-18 Compensation 
Haldimand County Niagara Region Wind Farm 30 90 15-Apr-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   315,000   $          3,500  26-Sep-11 Compensation, Transmission 




 $               -     $                 -        
Township of West Lincoln Niagara Region Wind Farm 44 132 15-Apr-11 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   462,000   $          3,500  16-Mar-16 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent North Kent 1 Wind Project 36 100.0 1-Apr-15 GEIA FIT     X  $   200,000   $          2,000    Partnership, Maintenance Contract 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Otter Creek Wind Farm Project (CANCELLED) 12 50.0 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP     X         
Town of Lakeshore Pointe Aux Roches 27 49 13-May-10 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $     44,280   $              904  13-Jul-10 Compensation 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Port Alma - T1 (KEPA) 44 101.0 21-Nov-05 RES II RES     X         
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Port Alma - T3 (Kruger Chatham) 44 99.4 14-Jan-09 RES III RES     X  $               -     $                 -        
Haldimand County Port Dover Nanicoke Wind Farm 45 81 4-Jun-10 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   283,500   $          3,500  26-Sep-11 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Raleigh Wind Energy Centre (Dillon) 52 78.0 12-Jan-09 RES II RES     X         
Township of Huron-Kinloss Ripley Wind Farm 38 76 21-Nov-05 RES II RES X 
  
 $        7,500   $                99  20-Mar-12 Compensation, Restoration 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Romney Wind Energy Centre 16 57.6 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP     X  $   144,000   $          2,500    Partnership, Maintenance Contract 
Town of Lakeshore Romney Wind Energy Centre 1 3.6 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP X 
  
 $     15,000   $          4,167  6-Nov-18 Compensation, Transmission 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent South Kent Wind Project 124 270.0 2-Aug-11 GEIA FIT     X  $   575,000   $          2,130    Maintenance Contract, Airport 
Municipality of Dutton Dunwich Strong Breeze Wind Farm (CANCELLED) 20 57.5 1-Apr-16 LRP I LRP X 
  
 $     60,000   $          3,000  1-Jul-15   
Haldimand County Summerhaven Wind Energy Centre 56 124.4 30-Apr-10 FIT 1 FIT X 
  
 $   435,400   $          3,500  26-Sep-11 Compensation, Transmission 




 $               -     $                 -      Compensation 
Municipality of Chatham-Kent Talbot Wind Energy Project (Spence) 43 99.0 14-Jan-09 RES III RES     X         
Prince Edward County White Pines Wind Farm (CANCELLED) 29 59.5 15-Jun-10 FIT 1 FIT     X         
Township of Frontenac Islands Wolfe Island Wind Farm 86 197.8 21-Nov-05 RES II RES X 
  
 $   645,000   $          3,261  1-Jun-06 Compensation 
NOTES: 
             * within municipal boundary 
1 (Loudermilk, 2017) 
               Not used in study 
            
 
